Target definition for shipwreck hunting by Kirsner, Kim
University of Notre Dame Australia
ResearchOnline@ND
Medical Papers and Journal Articles School of Medicine
2015
Target definition for shipwreck hunting
Kim Kirsner
University of Notre Dame Australia, kim.kirsner@nd.edu.au
Follow this and additional works at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/med_article
Part of the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons
This article was originally published as:
Kirsner, K. (2015). Target definition for shipwreck hunting. Frontiers in Psychology, 6.
Original article available here:
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01615/full
This article is posted on ResearchOnline@ND at
http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/med_article/716. For more information,
please contact researchonline@nd.edu.au.
This article originally published as:- 
Kirsner, Kim. (2015) Target definition for shipwreck hunting. Frontiers in Psychology (6). doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01615 
[This Document is protected by copyright and was first published by Frontiers. All rights 
reserved. It is reproduced with permission.] 
REVIEW
published: 28 October 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01615
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1615
Edited by:
Marek McGann,
Mary Immaculate College, Ireland
Reviewed by:
Martin Lages,
University of Glasgow, UK
Amanda Jane Barnier,
Macquarie University, Australia
*Correspondence:
Kim Kirsner
pkirsmer@bigpond.net.au
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Quantitative Psychology and
Measurement,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 18 June 2015
Accepted: 06 October 2015
Published: 28 October 2015
Citation:
Kirsner K (2015) Target definition for
shipwreck hunting.
Front. Psychol. 6:1615.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01615
Target definition for shipwreck
hunting
Kim Kirsner *
School of Medicine, University of Notre Dame, Fremantle, WA, Australia
The research described in the present article was implemented to define the locations of
twoWorldWar II shipwrecks, the German raiderKormoran, and the Australian light cruiser
HMAS Sydney. The paper describes the long and complex trail that led through inefficient
oceanographic prediction to ambiguous historical prediction involving a single report and
on to precise cognitive prediction based on nine reports from more than 70 survivors,
a process that yielded a single target position or “mean” just 2.7NM (nautical miles)
from the wreck of Kormoran. Prediction for the position of the wreck of Sydney opened
with wishful thinking that she had somehow reached the coast more than 100NM away
when cognitive analysis of the survivor’s reports actually provided the basis for accurate
prediction in a position near to the wreck of Kormoran. In the account provided below, the
focus on cognitive procedures emerged from, first, a review of a sample of the shipwreck
hunts, and, second, growing awareness of the extraordinarily rich database available
for this search, and the extent to which it was open to cognitive analysis. This review
touches on both the trans-disciplinary and the cognitive or intra-disciplinary issues that so
challenged the political entities responsible for supervising of the search for the wrecks of
Kormoran and Sydney. One of the theoretical questions that emerged from these debate
concerns the model of expertise advanced by Collins (2013). The decomposability of
alleged forms of expertise is revealed as a fundamental problem for research projects
that might or might not benefit from trans-disciplinary research. Where expertise can be
decomposed for operational purposes, the traditional dividing lines between experts and
novices, and fools for that matter, are much harder to discern, and require advanced and
scientifically informed review.
Keywords: shipwreck hunting, error, memory, decision making, cognition, mental models, trading zones
CONTEXT
HMAS Sydney and HSK Kormoran sank within an hour or two of each other and approximately
13 nm apart on November 19th, 1941. The British light cruiser and the German raider met by
chance while Sydney was steaming south from Sunda Strait to Fremantle and Kormoran was
searching for merchant targets before laying mines off the small coastal port of Carnarvon. The
vessels met on a clear afternoon and sighted each other at a distance of 20 or more nautical miles
(NM). Kormoran turned to the west to avoid combat but Sydney followed, and, when Sydney closed
to less than oneNM, combat was inevitable. Sydney had squandered her advantages in regard to
long range gunnery, director control, armor, and speed. Kormoran fired first and the engagement
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lasted less than 30 nm. Sydney was hit by at least fifty 155mm
rounds, hundreds of smaller missiles, and one torpedo, and she
sank with the loss of all hands about 5 h later. Kormoran was hit
by only three or four six inch rounds but one of those destroyed
her motive power and she was scuttled about 6 h after the battle
following an orderly disembarkation of the majority of her crew
in five lifeboats and two life-rafts. A brief history of the event was
published by Gill (1957, 1985).
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
Before the detailed analyses are considered, it is appropriate
to identify critical performance criteria for the domain, and to
underline the relationship between the performance criteria and
the author’s focus on the mean. The author has adopted three
performance criteria, and one simplifying convention.
The first and most important criterion corresponds to the
aim of this edition of Frontiers, and the focus on the challenge
of identifying an optimal search target or mean given six or
more forms of evidence, the impact of time on the accuracy
of each of those forms, and the inevitable presence of human
error. The convention involves the use of “Distance from the
wreck of Kormoran,” or Error, to minimize reliance on the
two-dimensional world of traditional cartography. Distances are
specified in nautical miles (NM), where oneNM = 1.85 km
or 1.15 statute miles. The primary challenge for wreck-hunters
involved extraction of a mean target position from the reports
available for a particular wreck. The first criterion therefore
involved Accuracy.
The second criterion involved selection of an efficient search
box, a box that must therefore include the wreck of Kormoran
while minimizing the size of the search area. The search areas
associated with the historical shipwreck searches of interest
ranged from 100 Square Nautical Miles or SNM to 600 SNM,
however the areas originally tabled for the search for Kormoran
involved far larger areas than that, up to 13,000 SNM or more in
some cases.
The third criterion involved the extent to which a particular
solution reflected the power and variety of the available evidence.
All other things being equal, a recommendation that reflected
one report and one report only must be set aside in favor
of a recommendation that reflected several reports or even a
substantial fraction of the available evidence. This approach
highlighted the weaknesses associated with cherry-picking. For
convenience, this criterion is referred to as Explanatory Power.
DISCIPLINES AND EXPERTISE
The question under review in this paper concerns the location of
the wrecks of Kormoran and Sydney. In retrospect, and with the
benefit of hindsight, it is now evident that many of the critical
entities in the search were overwhelmed by the shear variety
and the depth of the evidence available. The critical issue bears
some comparison with the signal detection challenge described
by Tanner and Swets (1954) more than half a century ago. But
there is another problem. Although Thagard (2005) described
the boundary regions between disciplines as a critical venue
for innovation in science, the absence of informed scientific
leadership among the entities responsible for management of
the search created an unsympathetic environment for science in
general and scientific innovation in particular.
Figure 1 identifies seven data types and four or possibly
five disciplines with an interest in the search for the wreck
of Kormoran. The presence of so many interested disciplines
reflected the shear variety and the volume of the known and
potential sources of data available for the search. The following
is a short summary of the available types of evidence and sources:
1. Flotsam (Oceanography): The first type of evidence involved
the positions of flotsam, information open to hindcasting
to reconstruct the point or points of entry into the water.
However, oceanographic hindcasting depends critically on an
understanding of the direction, velocity and stability of wind
and water currents, and the increasing challenge faced by
hindcasting with the passage of time, where time for this
search ranged from 84 to 209 h.
2. Lifeboat diary (Oceanography and Navigation): One person
in one of the lifeboats maintained a simple diary recording
performance data, evidence that enabled reconstruction of
the position of Kormoran. In practice, interpretation of the
diary depended on oceanographic as well as navigational
assumptions, and, if the former are misunderstood,
navigational reconstruction can be far off the mark.
3. Reports from Kormoran survivors (History and the Cognitive
Sciences): It is now apparent that the Kormoran survivors
provided more than 70 reports about the absolute or relative
position of Kormoran. In addition, RN and RAN servicemen
provided nearly 50 summary reports that included comment
about the location of the wreck.
4. Reports from observers on the coast (History and the Cognitive
Sciences): Commencing with journalist Bryan Clark in the
1980’s, more than 90 reports were accumulated from about 30
people living on the coast between Geraldton and Dirk Hartog
Island.
5. Magnetic Anomaly (Geophysics): The first WAMM/RAN
search in 1984 was driven by the presence of an anomaly off
the coast near Kalbarri, about 130 nm from the wrecks, and
received no support from any other source.
6. Map Dowsing: Commencing in 1989 Lindsay Knight and
Warren Whittaker claimed that a combination of hand-based
and electronic-based map dowsing procedures had located the
wrecks of Kormoran and Sydney near the Abrolhos Islands,
180 nm from the position of the wrecks.
7. The United States Navy (USN): Mike McCarthy, Curator
of the West Australian Maritime Museum (WAMM),
sought assistance from the USN subsequent to the 1991
Oceanography Workshop. The following quotations are from
a FAX from the Curator to David Gallo of the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute (WHOI) in Falmouth, Massachusetts
in 1992:
“My hopes for the search now lie in anti-submarine warfare
records, for it has long been my understanding that many
of the magnetic anomalies on the seafloor throughout the
world are known and have been mapped for strategic
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the disciplines that contributed to the Search Definition debate. The figure indicates the source of each type of report, and the form
or forms of expertise relevant to the report types, where known. The blue, brown, and red connections reflect the complexity of the relationships among the reports
and the disciplines. The gray boxes identify unproductive streams of argument. The aviation and maritime symbols reflect the focus of the WAMM and/or the services
in regard to research and search activities.
purposes. These suspicions have been long since confirmed in
discussions with the US, GB, and Australian anti-submarine
operatives and were first mooted here in the searches for the
SS Koombana many years ago.”
And significantly,
“If the approximate locations of the Sydney/Kormoran are
to be found by that route, my problem will be how to keep
confidential my source and yet not pretend that we had found
the wrecks purely by our own means.”
The overview of the disciplines involved in the search acknowledged the extra-
ordinarily rich mixture of evidence, expertise, wishful-thinking, and fantasy that
dominated the first 25 years of interest in the search for Kormoran and Sydney
as well as the challenge faced by the private and government entities that
engaged in supervision of the search, a challenge they accepted without
deploying, seeking, or recognizing the need for expertise.
OCEANOGRAPHIC AND NAVIGATION
ANALYSES
In 1991 the author approached the WAMM, and proposed that
it design and establish an oceanography workshop, the objective
of which was to adjudicate between the positions advanced by
Montgomery and Barbara Winter, the trigger for the author’s
initial interest in the project. The first question therefore involved
the power of the oceanographic procedures. Could they be used
to adjudicate between the positions advanced by Montgomery
and Winter?
The rationale for the position advanced by Winter was clear.
Winter (1991) included translations of critical elements from
Detmers’ Battle Summary, and the entry for 1700 h on November
19, 1941 included the following, “Straat Malakka 111E 26S.”
Winter had tabled the same general position in 1984 on the map
shown at page 160. The position was supported in the earlier
publication by reference to the statement by Winter that,
“Calculations, ignoring some minor variables, show that the
end of nautical twilight on 19th November 1941, latitude 26◦S
longitude 111◦E, was 1901G; the time quoted by Detmers, give
or take a minute.”
The critical issue, as recognized by Winter, involved the
distinction between the “private” and partially encoded values
in the Battle Summary, and the “public” positions provided to
the RAN interrogators during the Search and Rescue (SAR) and
interrogation processes during and following the SAR operation
in 1941. The weakness associated with this report involved the
probability that the report was intended to be accurate to only
the nearest degree, that is 26◦S 111◦E, as distinct from the nearest
minute, that is 26◦00′S 111◦00′E. Technically, the former involves
an area of approximately 3400 Square Nautical Miles (SNM).
Justification for the position advanced by Montgomery (1981)
was less clear, and relied on selection of one German report, and
a dubious claim about the location of the direct route from Sunda
Strait to Fremantle.
The original SAR operation conducted by the Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy
(RAN) betweenNovember 24th andNovember 29th 1941 yielded
eight reports about the locations of flotsam together with 11
reports about the locations of five lifeboats. Two further reports
involved the locations of two life-rafts, but these involved chance
meetings with passing vessels. The aerial arm of the operation
involved approximately nine systematic searches by Hudson
aircraft, searches that were dispersed over an area in excess of
30,000 SNM, but searches that were probably too high to detect
anything smaller than a lifeboat. In addition, long-range aircraft
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examined specific targets out to sea, and smaller aircraft searched
along the coast. The maritime arm of the search involved some
nine ships, and focused on the area where the flotsam was
observed.
Drifting Objects
Oceanographic reconstruction could be based on some or all of
the known positions of the objects discovered after the battle.
The objects comprised two life-rafts, three lifebelts, one float,
one dog kennel, and one raft, and they were discovered between
84 and 209 h after the battle. The critical questions therefore
concerned the elapsed time for each object, the drifting and/or
sailing characteristics of that object, and the direction, velocity
and, critically, the variability, of the currents and winds for the
period. In addition, as each object had individual characteristics,
the analysis had to be applied to each object as an independent
entity.
The professional contributions to the 1991 Oceanographic
Workshop used hind-casting based on themovements of some or
all of the objects that left Kormoran or possibly Sydney between
1800 and approximately 2300 h on November 19th, 1941. The
objects were discovered approximately 120NM north of the now
known position of the wreck of Kormoran. The hindcasting
analyses typically relied on velocity and bearing information
for four variables; current, wind, wind-driven current, and
leeway. The workshop yielded four professional reports. The
report implemented by Search and Rescue expert Hughes (1991)
actually included the position of the wreck of Kormoran but the
center of the search area was 33NM from that wreck, and the
overall area was ∼ 7850 SNM. A second, by oceanographers
Steedman and McCormack (1991), involved an area of ∼ 1000
SNM, but it did not quite include the wreck ofKormoran. A third,
by Penrose and Klaka (1991), did not include a search area but
it did specify a 30NM long contour that passed within ∼4NM
of the wreck. The fourth analysis, by CSIRO expert Alan Pearce
(1991) asserted that the amount of variability in the current and
wind values for the area precluded accurate prediction. The first
three reports are reflected in Figure 2.
The challenge posed by Pearce was evident in the current
rose re-published by him from the from the KNMI (Dutch)
Marine Atlas (See Figure 3A). What the figure highlights is
the extraordinary variability in the bearing and velocity of the
currents for the area. The figure should be considered in the
context of Figure 3B where the presence of huge eddies is
FIGURE 2 | Depicts positions advanced by Montgomery and Winter and results of 1991 Oceanography Workshop. The figure includes the
recommendation tabled by Gill (1957, 1985) as well as the now known position of Kormoran.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Monthly “current rose” from the KNMI Atlas for area encompassed by 25◦S, 28◦S, 110◦E, and 113◦E for November. (B) Example of oceanic high
showing the scale and the type of movement that complicated prediction off the coast of Western Australia.
noted. The eddies are up to 50KM in diameter, move in either
a clockwise or anti-clockwise direction (for highs and lows,
respectively), and the entire system moves gradually from West
to East. Furthermore, because the current observations involve
almost every point on the compass, the net drift vector, the
distance made good in any one direction, is very small. Pearce
wrapped up his argument in the following terms,
“It is concluded that “climatological” current data cannot be used
with any confidence to predict the likely currents which may have
carried debris from the HMAS Sydney away from the site of the
engagement.”
The role of oceanography for Search Definition was set aside by
the author in 1993 for four reasons; first, the size of the error circle
defined by Hughes and others was prohibitive for in-water search
purposes; second, the argument advanced against reliance on
oceanography by CSIRO-expert Alan Pearce underlined doubts
about the relevance of the discipline to the search; third, a review
that assigned little or no responsibility to oceanography for
historically significant searches by Ballard; and, fourth, evolving
awareness that the scale and reliability of the reports provided by
the survivors might not provide a platform for an efficient search.
The Navigation Argument
The critical note for reconstruction of the lifeboat voyage from
disembarkation to the coast is attributed to von Malapert, a
member of the crew on the lifeboat captained by Henry Meyer,
the navigator. The critical extract from VonMalapert’s Diary is as
follows:
(a) ET0-ET71: 12 h drifting, 59 h sailing at an estimated speed
of 1.1 knots 062◦, Distance sailed 63 miles; (b) ET71-ET90:
Drifted in Force 6–7 winds; (c) ET90-ET134; Sailed for 42 h at an
estimated speed of 1.9 knot; Estimated distance= 81 miles.
The Navigation argument can be thought of as one facet of
the oceanography analysis. Lifeboats, whether under sail or
not, are influenced by the direction, velocity, and duration of
the prevailing winds and currents. Steedman and McCormack
(1991), a professional oceanographer, reviewed, and rejected
analysis of the lifeboat journey, arguing that there were too many
unknowns about the sailing and drifting characteristics of the
lifeboats to accept the diary for formal analysis (Steedman and
McCormack, 1991).
In 2000, shortly after the death of Lindsay Knight,
owner/developer of the so-called Knight Direct Location
System, a map dowser’s dream, Warren Whittaker, his long-time
collaborator, finally abandoned map dowsing and advanced a
new argument for another target near the Abrolhos Islands. The
account was based on the diary maintained by von Malapert.
According to Whittaker (2000),
“These “logs” (i.e., written records from the German survivors)
contain clear evidence that the battle actually took place west of
the Abrolhos Islands and not in the northern or Detmers area.
The Abrolhos Islands site is consistent with KDLS Target No.
3 (suspected site of the wreck of HSK Kormoran) at 28◦39′S
113◦22′E; Error= 196NM) (Whittaker, 2000).
The claim advanced byWhittaker in 2000was contradicted by the
fact that both Meyer, the Kormoran navigator, and von Malapert,
specified the approximate distance covered by their lifeboat over
the entire voyage, and they put the distance at 150 miles and 153
miles respectively, about half of the distance from the Houtmann
Abrolhos Islands to Cape Cuvier by sea.
Whittaker was not the last person to focus on interpretation
of the diary. The first endorsement came from LCDR David
McDonald RAN.McDonald reviewed and distributed an analysis
of the lifeboat voyage that placed the point of origin in a large
ellipse off the coast in the latitude of Port Gregory, the latitude
long-advocated by his mother on the basis of the oral history
accounts described below (McDonald, 2003).
The second endorsement came from the RAN Seapower
Centre (Johnstone et al., 2003). The RAN conducted a Lifeboat
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1615
Kirsner Target definition for shipwreck hunting
workshop in order to facilitate recognition of the site of the
wrecks. An expert panel was formed to resolve the issue. The
panel’s conclusions were as follows:
“Analysis of the lifeboat voyage by the workshop panel suggests
that the correct site of the battle between SYDNEY and
KORMORAN lies between the Whittaker and Detmers positions.
However, given the paucity of information from the lifeboat
log, limited meteorological data from November 1941, and
unclear data on the handling characteristics of the lifeboat, the
actual position of the battle cannot be narrowed sufficiently to
confidently suggest the resting place of the KORMORAN wreck.
For these reasons also the Detmers and the Whittaker positions
cannot be definitively ruled out at this time.”
Consideration of the oceanographic evidence removed the Abrolhos arguments
from the table, rendered in-shore locations improbable, and indicated that the
discipline could not be used to provide an accurate or efficient solution.
HISTORICAL ANALYSES
In the first professional historical analysis of the engagement,
Herman Gill located the contact and battle positions for
Kormoran and Sydney near 26◦34′S 111◦E and 26◦40′S 110◦33′E,
respectively, the second of these positions being 42NM from the
wreck. Gill was not of course touched by any interest in a search
for the wrecks. As discussed above, Barbara Winter interpreted
Detmers’ Diary correctly, and located the battle and therefore the
wrecks in the vicinity of 26◦S 111◦E (Winter, 1984, 1991).
The next historical analysis was published by Wes Olson
in 2000. Based on the map on page 192 (Olson, 2000), Olson
locatedKormoran near 26◦34′S 111◦Ewhen she first encountered
Sydney on November 19th, and the extrapolation developed by
Olson placed the battle and therefore the wrecks near ∼ 26◦42′S
110◦35′E, 42NM from the wreck of Kormoran.
The final historical analysis, by Olson et al. (2001), reverted
to the argument advocated by Winter (1984); Winter (1991),
however their paper included a new and independent detail.
They assumed that 26◦34′S 111◦E specified Kormoran’s noon
position, and used dead reckoning based on Detmers’ account
of Kormoran’s subsequent movements to locate the wreck near
25◦58′S 110◦56′E. This position is 11NM from the wreck of
Kormoran, however, as they advocated a search circle with a
radius of 10NM only, their analysis did not quite include the
wreck of Kormoran.
The historical analyses focused almost exclusively on the
content and interpretation of the report included in Detmers
Battle Summary. Before turning to the cognitive analyses, brief
consideration will be given to the technologies that so captured
the attention of the WAMM, the RAN, and the public agencies
engaged in the search between 1981 and 2005.
The original historical argument provided a target accurate to only 30′ or
27–30NM, thereby defining an area of ∼ 3400SNM. When combined with
dead reckoning a more specific target was provided but in each case the
solution relied on only one report and one source, a source that had provided
inaccurate and inconsistent information at the time of the in-water search after
the engagement.
MAGNETIC ANOMALIES, MAP DOWSING,
AND ORAL HISTORY
The amount of credence placed on Montgomery’s claim by the
WAMM is evident in the fact that the relevant team used it to
justify an in-water search involving collaboration with the RAN
while searching to the south of 27◦ South, more than 130 nm to
the south of the position actually recommended byMontgomery,
and the position recommended by Winter, and the wreck of
Kormoran (See Green et al., 1984).
The Map Dowsing argument passed through two
incarnations. The first of these involved traditional hand-
based map dowsing or “divining” while the second was based
on the principle of Electron Spin Resonance. Each of these
procedures pointed to positions off the Abrolhos Islands, nearly
200NM from the now known positions of the wrecks. One of the
positions allegedly attracted a search from an RAN submarine
in 2000. In 2003, based on Whittaker’s interpretation of von
Malapert’s diary of the voyage of a lifeboat, the RAN established
a workshop involving four senior navigators, and provided
qualified endorsement for the navigation argument for the
Abrolhos Islands.
The Oral History argument reflected an interesting and
recently established branch of history, however it is usually used
to capture subjective experience as distinct from fine details about
the timing or the location of specific events. For example, Studs
Terkel, a key player in the tortuous history of the discipline, noted
that,
“They would sit around and tell us their hard luck story. Whether
it was true or not, we never questioned it. It’s very important
you learn people as they are. At that particular moment when
you are talkin’ to that person, maybe that’s how that person were.
Tomorrow they can be different people.” (Emma Tiller, a cook in
Western Texas, as reported by Studs Terkel, 1970).
In fact, the majority of the oral history reports submitted as
evidence of a battle near the Abrolhos Islands involved eye-
witness accounts by individuals, and the claim that they involved
Oral History was therefore problematic. As accounts based on
RemoteMemory, they involved critical flaws. For example, Bryan
Clark, the journalist who first recorded many of the stories in the
late 1980’s, opined that some of them at least reflected experiences
from later years, when Catalina maritime patrol aircraft flew
practice missions off Port Gregory. In our view (Kirsner and
Dunn, 1998c), the accuracy levels for recall of remote events are
so low after an interval of nearly 50 years that little confidence
can be placed in them (e.g., Wagenaar, 1986). Furthermore, the
historian providing advice to the Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade (JSCFADAT) advised that few
of the accounts included any form of link to the engagement
between Kormoran and Sydney. Statistical analysis supported this
argument and revealed that fewer than 10% of the accounts
actually included any link with Kormoran and Sydney at all.
Another line of argument indicated that the reports emerged
from positions covering more than 20,000 SNM, hardly a pointer
to a specific battle on a given day. None of these arguments
prevailed. The JSCFADAT gave the oral history argument pride
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of place for the 2001 Shipwreck Seminar; and the RAN and
the RAAF implemented expensive and risky aerial and surface
searches of the target positions identified by the oral historian.
Analysis implemented by the author and his colleagues rejected the remote
memory or “oral history” argument, despite strong support from WAMM and
the JSCFADAT (Kirsner and Dunn, 1998c), and the map dowsing case was
intrinsically weak (Kirsner and Dunn, 1998b).
THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Review of Wreck-Hunting
Following the Oceanography Workshop, and aware that
oceanography would not be able to provide a precise target,
the author sought to achieve a better understanding of the
challenges and solutions associated with deep-sea wreck-hunting.
The first section involved a review of the available evidence
on deep-sea/off-shore shipwreck hunting, with the focus on the
identification of search targets and the definition of search areas.
The critical history of the engagement between Kormoran and
Sydney was published by Hermon Gill in the first book of his two
volume history of the RAN in World War II (Gill, 1957, 1985).
Gill wrote more than 12 pages about the engagement between
Sydney and Kormoran, however, unavoidably, his analysis was
based exclusively on reports provided by the Kormoran crew,
and that was perhaps the first trigger for doubt among the
old salts in the local community. Further doubt about the
reliability of the reports provided by the Kormoran survivors
was facilitated by the fact that the Captain and the Navigator
provided inconsistent reports to the RAN officers during late
November and early December 1941. A second cause for doubt
arguably involved the gradual release of information about the
role of Signal Intelligence following World War II, a process that
was still yielding new information and an occasional surprise
up to the very end of the twentieth century (e.g., Fry, 2012). A
third issue that compromised the search debate between 1991
and 2013 involved the widespread assumption by the official
bodies associated with the search that a sou’wester was the key to
expertise, and that scientists without sou’westers had no business
entering the arena.
The first section of the review involved consideration of five
examples of deep-sea wreck-hunting. The first example involved
the search for the wreck of the Titanic, sunk on April 14th–
15th 1912. The search area adopted for the first three searches
for Titanic appear to have been constrained exclusively by
navigational reports about the position of the sinking, and the
resulting search involved only 100 SNM. In 1985 the area was
expanded by Ballard to 150 SNM to incorporate the southerly
movement of the lifeboats between the sinking and the rescue
but even here the critical factor involved navigational reports
about the final position of the lifeboats (i.e., without reference
to oceanographic assumptions), coupled with a decision to
commence the search beyond even that position, and shape the
in-water search from that position toward the estimated position
of the wreck of Titanic. In summary, the critical points were
determined solely by navigational reports although the reports
were selected to define a search area that reflected the movement
of lifeboats in the water. The current in-water technology enables
more efficient in-water search, but that should not be critical if
the actual search box has been chosen with due consideration for
uncertainty.
The second example involved the German battleship
Bismarck, sunk on May 26th 1941. The search area for Bismarck
was shaped around reports about the sinking position provided
by British battleships HMS King George V and HMS Rodney, and
British cruiser HMS Dorsetshire, although only the third of these
was present when Bismarck actually sank. As the search unfolded
however the focus shifted to a search for debris, and then a
landslide on an underwater mountain, the end of which finally
revealed the location of the wreck. The assumption adopted by
Ballard was that the landslide was actually triggered by Bismarck,
when it hit the ocean floor. Ballard indicated that the search area
involved was = 200 SNM. Descriptions of the search operations
for these wrecks are detailed in Ballard (2008), and available from
earlier reports by Ballard (1988, 1990); Ballard and Archbold
(1999).
The third example involved the US Aircraft Carrier Yorktown,
lost during the Battle of Midway. A review of the search indicated
that a search area of≤500 SNM was used by Ballard, and that the
area was specifically extended to the south in order to cater for
uncertainty about the distance covered by Yorktown between the
final aerial attack on the afternoon of June 5th and her sinking
on the morning of June 7th following a submarine attack on
June 6th.
The fourth example involved the search by David Mearns for
the bulk carrier Derbyshire. Initial analysis revealed three reliable
reports of oil slicks. Further, analysis suggested that the wreck
might be up to five nm to the north of the position where the oil
actually breached the surface. Mearns (1995) defined two search
areas, of ∼ 90 and ∼ 170 SNM as “high” and “low” probability
areas respectively, and the wreck was duly found in the predicted
area. It is a matter of interest that Mearns used “the principles of
modern probability analysis” as described by Discenza and Greer
(1994) to shape the search plan.
The fifth example involved the search byMearns for the wreck
of HMS Hood, sunk on May 24th, 1941. Information about this
search was not available in the public domain until 2001, and the
work did not therefore inform the author’s review. As described
by Mearns and White (2001) however, the record included no
fewer than 10 reports about the location ofHood. Mearns rejected
three of these because they depended on aerial calculation. Of
the remaining seven no fewer than five were from battleships or
cruisers and occupied a very tight box of approximately 40 SNM.
The remaining two involved positions determined by destroyers
and either dead reckoning or movement after a substantial time
lag (and therefore uncertainty over wind and current). Mearns
tabled two search boxes for operational purposes, of ∼ 600 and
200 SNM respectively, however the quantitative bases for these
areas remain unspecified. Mearns andWhite (2001, p. 107) noted
however that,
“The first two decisions were dictated by the simple application
of the navigational errors we had found to exist in the reported
sinking positions of the reported sinking positions during the
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First and Second World Wars. The errors that I chose to apply
in this case were divided into two different categories: the worst
error reported by a surface ship and the average error reported
by a number of surface ships. These circles of error were drawn
around each of the five most likely sites for Hood to have sunk.”
The details of the in-water searches conducted by Mearns have
not been published, as they formed “part of a commercial
operation.”
The history-based procedures implemented by Ballard
and Mearns realized substantially smaller search areas than
those generated by the 1991 Oceanography Workshop. The
three searches by Ballard involved areas that ranged 150–
500 SNM, values dramatically smaller than those generated by
the 1991 Oceanography Workshop, and areas that enabled
discovery of each of the wrecks concerned. The areas used
by Mearns in searches for the SS Derbyshire and HMS Hood
are less clear but they were probably less than 600 SNM,
and they too relied primarily on contemporary reports from
observers.
The review removed any doubt about the relative merits
of the oceanography-based and history-based procedures in
research to define accurate and efficient areas for in-water search.
The oceanography-based procedures yielded an overall area
of ∼8400 SNM for Kormoran [sum of areas provided by Hughes
(1991) and Steedman and McCormack (1991)], although even
that solution came with a significant caveat from CSIRO based
expert Alan Pearce. The central issue was therefore clear. As the
oceanography-based analyses forKormoran had produced search
areas between 10 and 100 times larger than the areas used for the
Titanic, Bismarck, and Yorktown searches, an historically-based
analysis was essential, and the author embarked on the collation
and analysis of the survivors’ reports.
The review indicated that search definition was dominated by reports from
captains, navigating officers and professional observers, and that it generally
resulted in areas of 500SNM or less.
The Kormoran Database
The critical question concerned the scope, extent, and reliability
of the reports provided by the German survivors. Given
inconsistent reports from the Captain and the Navigator, was
it possible to accept as valid reports from other crew members,
particularly if they too varied from report to report? The records
at WAMM provided an initial set to work on, and the books
published by Montgomery (1981) and Winter (1984) provided
pointers to additional material, however it was by no means
obvious that these sources covered the full extent of the reports
provided by the Kormoran survivors and the RN/RAN interviews
and interrogations.
The second step involved archival research in London,
Washington, and Norfolk, Virginia as well as Sydney, Perth,
Canberra, andMelbourne, in Australia.When combined with the
material available from Fremantle, the archival research yielded
a total of 73 reports that involved reference to the absolute or
relative location of Kormoran, a further nine about the bearing
and distance of Sydney relative to Kormoran for the period
between the battle and the last sighting of Sydney, and a further
44 that involved official or unofficial reports from RN or RAN
officers. Collation of the reports and the creation and analysis
of a substantial database located the project firmly within the
tradition of error analysis in Cognitive Psychology and Human
Factors. The project therefore required consideration of two data
types, involving the positions of objects in the ocean and the
reports of the survivors, and three methodological approaches,
involving oceanographic hindcasting, historical review, and
cognitive analysis and modeling.
The products of the archival research were summarized in the
following extract (Kirsner, 1997b). The paper was entitled The
War of the Ghosts: Using dusty records to hind-cast the locations
of HMAS Sydney and HSK Kormoran and it was presented to a
Humanities Conference at the University of Western Australia.
The traditional problem with archives is that they contain too
little information, and that too many inferences must therefore
be left to logical analysis or intuition. The archives concerning
the loss of Sydney and Kormoran arguably involved the opposite
problem where location is concerned. Analysis of the archives
and other historical sources revealed at least 60 separate sources
of information about the location or locations of the wrecks,
and these sources identified no fewer than 25 different sites,
only a few of which could be discounted absolutely. The sources
are, furthermore, distributed among five or six layers involving
SAR operations, the interrogation of survivors both during and
after the SAR operation, operational reports prepared by RN and
RAN officers, administrative reports, political reports and, finally,
historical argument. Worse still, the deeper layers even include
reports suggesting new sites, not recorded in the earlier reports.
The data depicted in Table 1 is a summary of the reports from the
Kormoran Database. The reports were obtained from numerous
sources. Some of these were available from Montgomery (1981)
and Winter (1984); some were from the library of the West
Australian Maritime Museum; some were obtained from the
state archives in Perth, Melbourne, Sydney, and Canberra; and
a handful were discovered in the national archives of the UK and
theUSA, and twowere discovered byHore andMearns in theOld
Admiralty Library in London. Most of the reports were collated
between 1993 and 1997, however additional items were added
later as they became available. A summary file was provided to
the Cole Commission at its request in 2008, and re-distributed by
it on request.
Table 1 can be read as a form of “stem and leaf” diagram. The
numbered reports in the fawn rows were included in the final
analyses; the reports with black bullets were treated as derivatives,
and discarded; and the bullets with open circles were treated as
outright errors.
The Kormoran Database comprised more than 70 reports by survivors about
the location of the wreck of Kormoran, a source of evidence that would be
invaluable for an accurate and efficient solution provided that the major part of
the database was reliable. A substantial database was essential if the solution
was to be efficient as well as accurate.
Reliability of the Kormoran Database
Figure 4 is a plot of the data from Table 1. The axes depict
the data in Log-Log coordinates. The y-axis reflects a log
transformation of the number of reports associated with each
Type of Report. The x-axis reflects a log transformation of the
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TABLE 1 | Stem and leaf plot of Reports from Kormoran survivors.
Type of Report AR E Comment
1. 26◦S 111◦E (to be read as ±30′) 17 Mode (including one report from Bunjes, two from Detmers)
• 26◦S 110◦E 2 EC including one report from Detmers
• 26◦S 1 EO
• 26◦S 11◦E 1 EO
• 26◦S 108◦E 1 EC
• 26◦S 111◦40′E 1 EC
• 26◦S 111◦21′E 1 EC
• 24◦S 111◦E 1 EC
• 25◦S 111◦E 2 EC including one report from Detmers
1a. 26◦S 111◦E (to be read as ±30′) 1 Meyer as revealed by diary in 2000
• 27◦S 111◦E 5 Initial reports from Meyer
• 26◦30′S 111◦40′E 1 Later report from Meyer
2. 120 nm from Coast 4 Bunjes; 120 nm selected on basis of MDP
• 150 nm from coast 2 EC
• 60 nm off land 1 EC
3. 160 nm SW of Cape Cuvier 0 Bunjes; Cape Cuvier selected on basis of MDP
◦ 160 nm SW of NW Cape 1
4. Geraldton signal 2 (gap) 7S 11115E 1 26◦07′S 111◦15′E selected on basis of MDP
◦ 7C 115E 1000 GMT 1
5. Sailed 150 nm NE to land 1 Meyer—lifeboat diary
• Sailed 153 nm NE to land 1 V Malapert—lifeboat diary
6. 26◦34′S 111◦E 3 6 Detmers: Winter (1991) classified as noon report
• 26◦32′S 111◦E 6 Detmers
• 25◦34′S 111◦E 2 Detmers
• 26◦31′S 111◦E 1 Detmers
7. 130 nm SW of Shark Bay 4 Habben
8. Due West of Shark Bay at 2000 h 1 Detmers to be “due west of Shark Bay at 2000”
◦ 120 nm SW of Fremantle 4 EC
◦ 100 nm off Fremantle 1 EC
◦ 130 nm due West of Perth 1 EC
◦ 125 degrees SW of Frem. 1 EC
◦ 20 nm SW of Fremantle 1 EC
Total 35 38
The numbered and colored items define the stems. The bulleted items comprise the leaves associated with each stem. The gray items are “pure” errors.
rank value of each Type of Report. Following Zipf (1949), the
resulting function is linear and the observed pattern is consistent
with the proposition that resource limitations played a role
in report selection and recall. Zipf demonstrated that a linear
relationship is observed for many relationships provided that
Log-Log axes are used. The r2-value for the survivors’ reports was
0.89, a value that accounts for more than 80% of the observed
variation in the data. A small sample of the many variables
that honor Zipf ’s Law includes word frequency distributions for
English (Zipf, 1949; Miller and Newman, 1958), recall (Kaplan
and Carvellas, 1969), and character frequency distributions for
Japanese Kanji (Speelman and Kirsner, 2005). The figure also
depicts the equivalent set of results for the 44 reports tabled by
RN and RAN officers, and it shows essentially the same pattern.
Zipf ’s Law does not constitute a “proof” in the definitive
sense of that term. Rather, it is a pattern we would expect
to observe in a memory study involving recall of a number
of words. The distributions of the reports are consistent with
the proposition that the observed patterns reflected randomly
distributed memory or transcription errors. The most obvious
alternative hypothesis involved the argument that the Kormoran
survivors rehearsed their answers. In the extreme case, this
approach would have produced just one Type of Report, or
something close to that. The fact that the reports were distributed
across eight or more than eight referents contributed to the
assumption of reliability.
Two issues were critical to the final assessment; first, the
fact that no fewer than eight independent groups of reports
or constraints pointed toward the same general position, and,
second, the fact that all five lifeboats either arrived at or were
approaching one point on the coast when they were discovered
by rescue craft, a degree of convergence that would have been
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FIGURE 4 | Zipf functions for the Kormoran survivors (blue circles) and
RN/RAN officers (red circles) associated with the 1941 interrogations
and interviews. The figure depicts Log Frequency plotted against Log Rank
for each set of data.
improbable had the survivors had no idea where they were, or
where they were going.
Mathematical analyses determined that the Database was reliable, overall,
although it was clear that a number of individual reports were not.
The 2004 Solution
The majority of the reports used for the wreck-hunts described
in the review relied on reports from navigators about the
coordinates of the vessel prior to or at the moment of loss. Each
set of reports involved some variability among the navigators
who reported the loss of a vessel, involving the own ship
navigation, time of the observation, or the position of the
survivors, however they all relied on professional reports, where
precision was reduced because each navigator produced a unique
solution. The Kormoran Database reflected a very different form
of evidence and error. Many of the reports provided only a
general guide to the location of Kormoran at the time of her
loss, for sailors at sea, and at risk, and an alternative approach
therefore involved a weaker assumption that all or at least many
of the reports were valid, and could therefore be considered as
a set to point to the position of the wreck. Working alone in
the first instance, and then in collaboration with John Dunn,
this approach was refined in four stages. The stages were as
follows:
1. Discount and remove obvious errors from consideration.
2. Group reports that involved a single concept, or “root,” in
evolutionary terms.
3. Develop principles to resolve competition when reports in a
single group involved inconsistent evidence.
4. Design and implement a mathematical decision model to
integrate the surviving statements or constraints, the task
completed by John Dunn.
The Constraints
The overall procedure was designed to produce a single and
accurate estimate of the location of the wreck of Kormoran.
The analysis evolved over the period 1991–2004. The concept of
converging operations shaped the research.
Constraint 1: 26◦S 111◦E
The majority of the 18 reports that involved 26◦S 111◦E
were provided by Wireless Telegraphy Officers (WTOs), adding
further weight to the validity of the report. The critical weakness
with the mode is that the position as reported, 26◦S 111◦E,
is accurate to only the nearest degree, and for wreck-hunting
purposes it should therefore have read 26◦ ± 30′S 111◦ ± 30′E,
where provision for error identified a search area of 3400 SNM.
Constraint 2: Report by Bunjes that the battle occurred
“120 nm from the coast”
The second constraint involved the distance from the coast.
Three estimates were available from the reports from the
Kormoran survivors, at 60, 120, and 150 nm. One hundred
twenty nanometer was adopted for two reasons: First, Bunjes
provided 120 nm value on three occasions during the fortnight
after the battle whereas he provided the value of 150 nm in
one report only, and years after the event; and, second, 120 nm
provided a better fit with the first and third constraints under the
Minimum Distance Principle described below.
Constraint 3: 160 nm SW of NW Cape (interpreted as Cape
Cuvier)
The third constraint, also attributed to Bunjes, involved the
report that the battle occurred 160 nm “South-West of North-
West Cape.” North-West Cape is more than 300 nm from the
area of the battle, and out of the game. An error is the obvious
explanation but what sort of error. While the author was working
out the tracks of the lifeboats in 1991 (Kirsner, 1991), detailed
analysis indicated that all five of the lifeboats could have been
heading for the same position on the coast. Two of the lifeboats—
those captained by Meyer and Kohn–beached 5 and 12 nm north
of Cape Cuvier respectively, and the other three were sailing east
and more and less directly for Cape Cuvier after some 4 or 5 days
drifting to the north with the current and wind.
Triangulation
Given the availability of multiple and converging constraints,
triangulation provided an appropriate model for our approach to
the problem. Maritime triangulation is illustrated in Figure 5A.
In that example the approximate location of a ship is assumed to
be inside the triangle defined by convergence among the three
observations or “Lines of Position” specified by the navigator.
Figure 5B is a summary of three reports provided by Wilhelm
Bunjes, a sometime officer in the pre-war German merchant
marine. Argument for the reliability of Bunjes’ intentions came
from the fact that one of his reports about the Kormoran officer’s
was “masked” in the archives for nearly 30 years, allegedly to
protect him from repercussions associated with his anti-Nazi
sentiments.
Although the Kormoran Database included reports that relied
on a variety of referents, including cartographic coordinates,
distance from the coast, and distance and bearing from coastal
features, it is evident that Bunjes’ reports converged on a
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Illustration of triangulation as the term is generally understood by mariners (Hansel, 2011). (B) Convergence among reports from Bunjes. The circle
and the rectangle represent 26◦00′S 111◦00′E, and 26◦S 111◦E, respectively.
single “position,” a position that could be used to define the
point of disembarkation from Kormoran prior to her sinking.
Convergence was not straightforward. As indicated above in
regard to the first three constraints, convergence was achieved
only when Cape Cuvier was substituted for North-West Cape
as the coastal feature, and 120NM was adopted in preference to
150 and 60NM as the distance from the coast, and even then the
“error” associated with the first constraint a significant handicap.
The authors’ use of triangulation is closer to its nautical roots
than it is to the role of triangulation in the social sciences
(e.g., Yeasmin, 2012). In the latter case it constitutes a form
of validation although it may also be implemented in order to
increase “understanding” of a specific problem. In the present
case however, triangulation is being used to refine the location
of a wreck by using “Lines of Position” when most if not all of
the lines involve an element of potential but unknown error and
uncertainty.
The approach outlined above involves very different principles
and assumptions from the oceanographic models, however it
is the contrast with the historical analyses that is particularly
interesting. Six historians or teams of historians tabled solutions
to the Search Definition problem; Gill (1957, 1985); (Error =
42NM), Winter (1984); Winter (Error = 7NM), Winter (1991);
Winter (Error = 7NM), Olson (2000); Olson (Error = 42 nm),
Olson et al. (2001, Error = 11 nm), and Hore and Mearns
(2003); Hore and Mearns (Error = 7NM), and in each case
attention was restricted to a single option or interpretation of
one or possibly two reports. It is evident that the attention of
the historians was focused either substantially or exclusively on
the reports provided by Detmers, the Captain of Kormoran,
and that the only issue that vexed them concerned the relative
merits of the noon and battle interpretations of 26◦34′S 111◦E.
Indeed the only individuals or teams to opt for that remote
position as the position of the battle and therefore the wrecks
were Gill (1957, 1985), Olson (2000), and Mearns (e.g., Finding
Sydney Foundation, 2007), and Mearns included the so-called
noon position, 26◦34′S 111◦E, in the in-water search area
in 2008, a decision that depended on his recommendation
alone.
Constraint 4: 2#◦#7′S 111◦15′E; Geraldton signal received at
1800G (interpreted as 26◦07′S 111◦15′E)
The Geraldton signal has come down to us in two forms. The first
form was included in a report prepared by SWACH and dated
November 27th. The wording of the report is as follows:
“Geraldton radio reports that at 1005Z/19/11 they received a weak
message. The beginning was unintelligible. Then followed “7C
115E 1000 GMT.” The radio operator could not estimate the
distance. No Qs were distinguished. They waited 2min but there
was no repetition”
The second version of the report is included in the Fremantle
Report of Operations for the period November 24–29th (see
Olson et al., 2001, p. 38). The wording of this report is as follows:
“At about the same time Geraldton radio picked up a weak signal
unintelligible excerpt for ’2 (gap) 7 111 15 East 1000 GMT (These
two reports were not received until 1345H/27)”
The number of operational and cognitive steps between the
Kormoran transmission and the SWACH report of operations
is difficult to estimate. Radio signals occurred in noisy
environments, and it is no accident that signal detection
theory (Tanner and Swets, 1954) evolved as a response to the
classification problems experienced by radio operators during
and after World War II (e.g., Shannon, 1949). We can safely
assume that the radio operator in Geraldton was dealing with a
noisy signal. She or he may have misheard parts of the signal.
They may have heard it correctly but made a transcription error.
They may have transcribed the signal correctly, only to have a
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supervisor introduce an error, in reading or during preparation
of a signal for transmission to SWACH. We do not know for
example why the second report comprised “2 (gap) 7” whereas
the first comprised “7C,” and we probably never will.
The Minimum Distance Principle
The solution adopted to solve the uncertainty associated
with this potential constraint involved the Minimum Distance
Principle. In brief, six alternative interpretations of the signal
were benchmarked against the established candidates; that is,
constraints 1, 2, and 3, and the alternative that involved the
smallest movement was adopted. The positions in the mix were;
25◦37′S 111◦15′E, 25◦47′S 111◦15′E, 25◦57′S 111◦15′E, 26◦07′S
111◦15′E, 26◦17′S 111◦15′E, and 26◦27′S 111◦15′E. As illustrated
in Figure 6, the fourth of these positions provided the best
fit, and 26◦07′S 111◦15′E was therefore adopted as the fourth
constraint.
Constraint 5: Meyer’s “lifeboat originated 150–153 nm SW of
landing point”
The critical information is summarized in Section
Oceanographic and Navigation Analyses, The Navigation
Argument. The uncertainty associated with the relevant estimate
was acknowledged by Meyer.
Constraint 6: Report from Detmers’ Battle Summary: 26◦34′S
111◦East
Barbara Winter provided the critical interpretation of Detmers’
Battle Summary (Winter, 1991). Her analysis left no doubt that
26◦34′S 111◦E and 26◦S111◦E were the noon and battle positions
of Kormoran, respectively.
We nevertheless used the distance between the solution
offered by this potential constraint and the position provided by
other constraints to test the noon and battle interpretations of
Detmers’ report. The noon interpretation won that competition
too, and we therefore adopted the noon interpretation for
integration purposes. Our dead reckoning analysis confirmed
the argument advanced by Olson et al., 2001, and yielded a
solution oneNM to the North of theirs, 12NM from the wreck
of Kormoran.
Constraint 7: Report by Habben: “130 nautical miles
south-west of Shark Bay”
Siebelt Habben, a medical doctor, was repatriated to Germany in
1943 as part of a Prisoner-of-War exchange. Habben provided
descriptions of the action between Kormoran and Sydney to the
German naval authorities, and the Kreigsmarine subsequently
included them in Operationen and Taktiks, Volume 10.
Constraint 8: Detmers’ statement that Kormoran should be
due west of Shark Bay at 2000G
According to Detmers (1959),
“The KORMORAN was proceeding at medium speed on her
usual sweep and gradually approaching Shark’s Bay from the
south west. At 1500 h I checked the ship’s course and decided
to carry on without change until 2000 h, and then turn eastward
toward Shark’s Bay.”
This solution to this constraint also involved dead reckoning,
from the assumed track of Kormoran from noon to 1700 h.
Constraint 9: Mathematical analysis identified a “circle of
equal speed” for the life-rafts discovered by Aquitania and
Trocas
This analysis was submitted to and published by the 2001
Shipwreck Workshop (Dunn and Kirsner, 2001). The
mathematical model designed by Dunn was based on three
assumptions about the life-rafts;
FIGURE 6 | The Minimum Distance Principle. Distance between six candidate interpretations of the signal and the position defined by the first three constraints.
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• They were under the influence of the same currents and winds,
and they would therefore display essentially the same “sailing”
characteristics.
• They had similar buoyancy and “sailing” characteristics, and
they would therefore move downwind in a similar direction
and at a similar velocity.
• They would conform to wind direction ±35◦, an assumption
accepted by the Search and Rescue profession.
The cross in Figure 7 denotes the now known position of
Kormoran. The distance between Kormoran and the nearest
point on the circle is ∼2 nm. The blue circles denote the areas
advanced at the 1991 Oceanography Workshop by Hughes
(1991) and Steedman and McCormack (1991). The Circle of
Equal Distance reflected a purely mathematical solution based
only on the assumption that the life-rafts were influenced by the
same forces, and drifted at the same velocity. The area of the red
circle is irrelevant; prediction involved the circumference.
Integration
In 2004 John Dunn designed a mathematical generalization of
the Minimal Distance Principle. The aim of the generalization
was to identify the most likely position of the wreck, and the
procedure involved selection of the position that involved the
smallest “movement” for the set of nine constraints outlined
above. We therefore integrated all of the available information
under the assumption that each piece of information would
be broadly consistent with the remainder, and that integration
would converge on the most likely point.
FIGURE 7 | Circle of Equal Distance (Figure from Dunn and Kirsner,
2001).
For each candidate location, corresponding to a point in the
ocean, and each constraint, we calculated the minimum distance
that the candidate location would have to be moved in order
to satisfy the constraint exactly. We referred to this measure
as the error distance for each location-constraint pair. We then
calculated the average error distance across the set of constraints
for each location which then provided a single goodness of fit
measure for that location. Clearly, a candidate location with a
relatively small average error distance satisfies the constraints
to a greater extent than a point with a relatively large average
error distance. No single candidate location satisfied all of the
constraints exactly.
Averaging the error distances treats each constraint as having
the same weight or importance. We considered and rejected a
range of weighting schemes, however we were not persuaded
that there was any basis for treating one constraint as more
critical than another. We were also guided by studies of expert
decision making in which equally weighted linear models (so-
called improper linear models) are nearly as efficient as optimally
weighted models (Dawes, 1979).
Integration yielded 26◦04′S 111◦02′E as the position of the
wreck. This position is 2.7 nm from the true position of the wreck
as established by the FSF in 2008 (Finding Sydney Foundation,
2008). The approach was described by Kirsner and Dunn (2004)
and Dunn and Kirsner (2011). The recommendation was also
used and published by the FSF in 2005 and 2007.
Performance
Accuracy
FSF Director Bob King chaired the Technical Search Committee
of the FSF from 2005 to 2007 inclusive. In 2005 King designed a
Powerpoint presentation for use by the FSF. The critical figure is
reproduced as Figure 8 below. The figure includes the positions
recommended for Kormoran and Sydney by the FSF in 2005 on
the basis of the arguments and recommendations advanced by
Kirsner and Dunn (2004). They are depicted as black stars (from
the original) identified by the black labels (added) indicating the
names of the two ships. The now known positions of the two
wrecks are depicted by solid red circles identified by red labels,
FIGURE 8 | Map including search areas prepared by Bob King for use
by FSF in 2005. The figure compares the predicted and observed positions of
the wrecks Finding Sydney Foundation (2005).
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each of which has been added to the map. The errors for the two
recommendations were 3 and 9NM for Kormoran and Sydney
respectively. Research and argument advanced subsequent to that
date was superfluous, and served only to transfer responsibility
for the success of the search.
Efficiency
The pink rectangle and the purple quadrant indicate the search
areas recommended by the FSF for Kormoran and Sydney
respectively, in 2005. The area of the pink rectangle, the
recommended search box for Kormoran, reflected conventional
statistical analysis based on the latitude and longitude values
associated with each of the nine constraints. The area was
therefore defined by the 95% confidence intervals for the x
(longitude) and y (latitude) values based on positions attributed
to each of the nine constraints. The area of the rectangle,
400 SNM, and the location of the wreck of Kormoran, can be
compared with the area of 2200 SNM adopted by the FSF on the
advice of Mearns a few weeks before the in-water search in 2008.
Explanatory power
The final cognitive analysis reflected the majority of the data
summarized in Table 1. The cognitive solution was, furthermore,
consistent with the known tracks of Sydney through the area,
and the oceanographic solutions described above although these
considerations did not contribute directly to the quantitative
solution. The historical analyses exploited only the report
originally extracted by Winter from Detmers’ Diary (Winter,
1991), based on the noon position plus dead reckoning.
The research provided an accurate estimate of the position of
the wreck of Kormoran, an efficient solution given a search box
of < 400 SNM, and it exploited more than 50% of the items in
the Kormoran Database. The research also provided an accurate
estimate of the location of Sydney, based on a time series analysis
of her reported bearing and distance from Kormoran over a 5 h
period after the battle.
Opportunity Cost
The author did not review information about the 1968 search for
the USS Scorpion prior to creation of the Kormoran Database.
However, in 2006, when the FSF invited John Dunn and
the author to table a new search proposal, we revisited the
Search Definition problem, gave consideration to the Baysian
description of the search for Scorpion (See Sontag and Drew,
1999), and tabled a new proposal that included provision for
expert-based weighting for the individual constraints.
SKILL ACQUISITION
Table 2 is a summary of the recommendations advanced by the
author and his colleagues between 1991 and 2005. The Search
Definition problem was solved by Australian science for both
Kormoran and Sydney by 2005.
The foregoing analysis described the collection and analysis
of evidence concerning the location of the wreck of Kormoran.
The improvement in performance summarized in Table 2
and Figure 9 does not reflect the performance of either a
TABLE 2 | Summary of positions advanced by the author and his
colleagues for Kormoran.
Sources Coordinates Error (NM)
STAGE 1: OCEANOGRAPHY/SAR
Kirsner, 1991 25◦58′S 111◦24′E 22
Kirsner et al., 1992 26◦01′S 111◦16′E
26◦01′S 111◦20′E
12
15
Kirsner and Hughes, 1993 ∼26◦13′S 111◦25′E 17
STAGE 2: COGNITION—CONVERGING OPERATIONS
Kirsner, 1997a 26◦15′S 111◦E 10
Kirsner and Dunn, 1998a 26◦15′S 111◦E 10
Finding Sydney Foundation, 2001 ∼26◦06′S 110◦52′E 11
Finding Sydney Foundation, 2003 ∼26◦10′S 111◦10′E 7
STAGE 3: COGNITION—DECISION MODEL
Kirsner and Dunn, 2004, 2008;
Dunn and Kirsner, 2011; King,
2014; Kirsner and Dunn, 2014
26◦04′S 111◦02′E 3
Finding Sydney Foundation, 2005:
Acknowledged Kirsner and Dunn
26◦04′S 111◦02′E 3
Finding Sydney Foundation, 2007:
Acknowledged Kirsner and Dunn
26◦04′S 111◦02′E 3
single individual or a regular team in the traditional sense
of these terms. The task of wreck-hunting lies somewhere on
a continuum of decomposability. At one extreme, the slow,
and fundamental changes involved in landing safety on aircraft
carriers (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003, p. 5) and construction
time for Liberty ships during World War II (Searle and Gody,
1945). Involved massively decomposable tasks where dozens
or even hundreds of people contributed to the improvement
in performance. The skills associated with accurate kicking
for an oval-shaped Australian Football League football can be
decomposed for learning purposes but they cannot be distributed
across players or experts during a game. Each one has to kick the
ball for himself or, on rare occasions, herself.
Figure 1 identified a number of discipline-specific approaches
to wreck-hunting, several of which were adopted by the author
and his colleagues. The learning curve observed in Figure 9
arguably reflects transitions across domains, from oceanography
(1991–1993) to history to the cognitive sciences including
adoption of a formal decision model. The critical drivers
reflected: first, the construction of a substantial database; second,
decisions about the viability of the report data; and, third,
adoption of informal and then formal approaches to the use of
multiple constraints. The research also reflected a coherent and
evolving approach to a clearly defined problem concerning the
location of the wreck of Kormoran, and, critically, it reflected
input from a variety of disciplines, domains and scientists,
individuals with diverse backgrounds.
Figure 9 includes the positions that the author and his
colleagues tabled between 1991 and 2004. All of the positions in
the plot are shown against an ordinate that indicates the distance
between the position recommended and the position of the wreck
of Kormoran, and the plot therefore reflects learning or skill
acquisition. The reports formed three obvious groups involving
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FIGURE 9 | Performance (Error) for the author and his colleagues
between 1991 and 2005.
oceanography, informal analysis of the Kormoran Database, and
formal or mathematical instantiation of the Minimum Distance
Principle on the database respectively. The model tested a
potentially infinite range of candidate locations, and selected the
position that involved the smallest possible amount of movement
for the set of nine constraints. The one and only solution
associated with the third stage of the project therefore involved
26◦04′S 111◦02′E, a position just 2.7 nm from the wreck of
Kormoran.
EXPERTISE
The path of improvement from 1991 to 2005 reflected input from
no fewer than three disciplines, oceanography, history, and the
cognitive sciences. One implication of this perspective is that the
research involved both a horizontal trajectory, as we accepted
and understood the limitations and opportunities associated
with oceanographic and historical research respectively, and a
vertical trajectory, as we implemented successive more and more
powerful cognitive analyses of the survivors’ reports. In so far as
the project involved a vertical skill acquisition path, it conformed
to the tradition established by John Anderson more than 30 years
ago (e.g., Anderson, 1982), as well as the more specific benefits
associated with transfer involving component process models,
models that might or might not cross domain boundaries (e.g.,
Speelman and Kirsner, 2005).
The horizontal trajectory reflects an argument advanced
by Engeström and his colleagues (e.g., Engeström and
Sannino, 2010). According to Engeström (2014) for
example,
“Learning by Expanding challenges traditional theories that
consider learning a process of acquisition and reorganization of
cognitive structures within the closed boundaries of specific tasks
or problems.”
Elsewhere, Engeström (1996) proposed that learning is not
restricted to “vertical movement across levels” but should also
be viewed as “horizontal movement across borders.” From
a cognitive perspective however, the boundaries between the
domains and the skills can be inherently fuzzy, and improvement
will depend on comprehension and practice at the level of the
component processes, and the discipline behind a given process
might or might not be critical.
People acquire expertise or skill over a more or less unlimited
range of domains and problems. The shear variety of the
domains encompassed by human enterprise is formidable, and
few attempts have been made to provide a universal model; that
is, a model that covers all realms of human activity. To list but
five disparate topics, a universal model would need to cater for
the acquisition of skill or expertise in everything from cigar-
rolling (Crossman, 1959) to survival in aerial combat (Spick,
1989), teamwork on the navigation bridge of a notional escort
carrier (Hutchins, 1996), the reduction of flying accidents on
Aircraft Carriers over 50 years (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003)
and construction times for Liberty ships (Searle and Gody, 1945).
Wreck-hunting is just another cab off the ranks in the drive to
describe and understand expertise and, if possible, define not
only universal principles, such as the power law of learning, but a
universal taxonomy as well.
Collins (2013) has offered a useful starting point in regard
to a universal taxonomy with a three-dimensional model of
expertise. Themodel was introduced under the heading of Studies
of Expertise and Experience, and Figure 10 honors the Expertise-
Space Diagram depicted by that author.
The dimensions described by Collins were as follows:
1. The first or diagonal dimension is referred to as “Individual or
group accomplishment” by Collins but the author has adopted
a more traditional approach, treating this dimension as “Skill
Acquisition,” or, more simply, Skill, a term that usually
pre-supposes qualitative changes in information processing
strategies or processes as individuals or groups transit from
novice to expert.
2. The second dimension described by Collins refers to the
“transmission of domain-specific tacit knowledge,” or Tacit
Knowledge, involving either groups or individuals. The
dimension is referred to as Tacit Knowledge in Figure 10, and
depends on “immersion in the society of those who already
possess it” (Collins, 2013, p. 3).
3. The third dimension referred to by Collins is “Esotericity,” and
this dimension is depicted on the vertical axis in Figure 12.
According to Collins (2013, p. 5).
“While traditional analyses take the word “expert” to refer only
to rare, high-level, specialists, SEE (i.e., the model described by
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FIGURE 10 | Three dimensional model of expertise (from Collins, 2013). (A) reflects classification by a notional wreck-hunter. (B) reflects classification by the
author, a classification that depends on the assumption that expertise for wreck-hunting is open to decomposition, a fourth dimension.
Collins) considers that ordinary language-speaking, literacy and
the like exhibit a high degree of expertise even though everyone
has them—they are ubiquitous. This is, perhaps, one of the
most radical contributions of SEE to the analysis of expertise
as indicated by the initial strong opposition to the idea of
“ubiquitous expertise” from philosophers and psychologists. Part
of the task of this paper will be to try to make it obvious that
the idea of ubiquitous expertise is a necessity if we are to avoid
confusion.”
In the following analysis, and in Figure 10, the term rarity
is preferred to esotericity because of its frequency in natural
language and its quantitative roots. A critical issue raised by
Collins concerned the rarity of the relevant skills or expertise in
his three-dimensional model of expertise. Collins questioned the
traditional view that experts are of necessity “unusual individuals
who have self-consciously devoted many hours of their lives
to gaining a special ability.” Instead, and based in part on the
proposition that all native speakers of a language are experts
to a greater or lesser extent in their native language, Collins
mounted an argument against the esoteric or rarity characteristic
of expertise, and proceeded to assert that “the idea of ubiquitous
expertise is a necessity.” Later, when faced with the challenge
posed by racing car drivers, he proposed that the relevant skills
form a body distinct from that of driving in general.
The importance of decomposition is evident. Changes in
construction times for Liberty ships built in the US ranged from
about 1.2 million man-hours per ship in the early days to less
than 0.5 million man-hours per ship after 2000 or more vessels
had been constructed. While a team of experts would have been
essential to the design, co-ordination and management of each
project, the improvement in ship-building times reflected many
and widely distributed forms of expertise.
Another type of skill that reflects practice involved the
performance and survival of fighter pilots in World Wars I and
II (See Spick, 1989). Spick, for example, depicted the extent to
which the probability of survival as a fighter pilot increased
as a function of missions completed. Task analysis in this case
involved a totally different picture from ship-building. The task
of flying and fighting in World War I aircraft depended on
indivisible expertise, expertise that accumulated with combat
experience. The role of decomposition is quite different in this
case however. While decomposition would have been possible
and even desirable for instruction and training purposes, it was
not possible to spread the skill across individuals under combat
conditions, and each individual fighter pilot had to bring a
full suite of skills to bear on the combat problem. Thus, while
expertise can be distributed across thousands of engineers and
craftsmen for ship-building, and reflect skill acquisition for the
corporate entities as well as the individual tradesmen, a very
different story applied to the performance of fighter pilots during
World Wars I and II, and decomposition was not feasible under
operational conditions.
But where does the foregoing analysis leave wreck-hunting
in regard to expertise, or indeed, any research challenge that
involves or could involve trans-disciplinary forms of expertise?
The owners of the traditional forms of expertise might be
reluctant to include provision for trans-disciplinary expertise,
particularly if their background did not prepare them for
challenges of this type.
Figure 10A depicts the model that a professional wreck-
hunter might assert, and the model that was asserted or endorsed
by virtually all of the parties involved the search for Kormoran
and Sydney. However, as implied in the foregoing analysis, wreck-
hunting can be treated as a decomposable example of expertise,
involving a series of semi-independent skills or components. The
critical issue implied by Figure 10B is that the set of reports from
the Kormoran Database was open to analysis and interpretation
by any one of a large number of cognitive scientists. In many
cases we would have required support from historians and
linguists but that can be assumed for multi- or trans-disciplinary
projects. Figure 10 therefore provides two frames of reference
for a discussion of expertise in wreck-hunting; that of the wreck-
hunter who claims that he or she is the only person who can solve
the problem, and that of the cognitive scientist who claims that
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wreck-hunting can be decomposed into component skills, skills
that are widely distributed in the scientific community.
The argument outlined in this section has significant ramifications for the
agencies and individuals responsible for unprecedented challenges such as
those faced by the officials associated with the searches for Kormoran and
Sydney, and, more recently, Malasia Airlines 370. The decision space should not
be dominated by mate-ship and political expediency. Where inter- and trans-
disciplinary opportunities are or might be relevant, effective leadership should
involve scientifically informed and flexible leadership.
CONVERGING OPERATIONS, TRADING
ZONES, AND “ENACTIVE” COGNITION
The author is not aware of any past attempts to consider or
review wreck-hunting as a domain of expertise. The challenge
is further complicated by the fact that it depends on several
more specific forms of expertise, and few people will enjoy the
complete set of skills involved. The project outlined in this
paper therefore involved a de facto “trading zone” (See Thagard,
2005), or, to be more specific, an attempt to exchange ideas
and approaches among navigators, oceanographers, historians,
and cognitive scientists. The solution actually involved an
expansion of triangulation, with nine as distinct from three
Lines or Estimates of Position. However, the general principles
guiding the cognitive approach to the challenge remained
stable throughout the research, and relied on the presence of
multiple constraints to negate the uncertainty and possible error
associated with many if not all of the available reports. Given
the central role of triangulation, a task that traditionally involved
the use of maps, rulers, and Lines of Position, our analysis
provides an interesting fit to the framework offered by Enactive
Cognition (Froese et al., 2012). Specifically, it involves a task
where the “cognitive agents” implement triangulation to solve
a problem—to define the location of a wreck—and the physical
vehicle for implementation, be it in a map, a head or a computer,
is of secondary importance. Thus, triangulation constituted
the critical scaffold for prediction, and the deep challenge
facing us as scientists involved the selection and, if necessary,
refinement of new Lines or Position. The solution was also
consistent with earlier lines of argument involving: publications
and papers describing the search and rescue solution, the
SAR/Oceanography solution published by Sam Hughes, the
Sunda Strait to Fremantle tracks taken by Sydney on earlier
voyages, and the lifeboat tracks from the probable point of
disembarkation from Kormoran to the coast.
As argued by Thagard (2005), science has changed out of
recognition over the course of the twentieth century. Whereas,
the early days of the century witnessed the establishment of the
now traditional disciplines and divisions, some of which have
been retained in the current curricula of universities, many of the
critical advances in science and technology reflected migration to
the boundaries of the established disciplines, as, like memes, they
embarked on new inter-disciplinary journeys of their own. These
transformations are particularly clear in the new and rapidly
changing sciences, and the industries behind them, underwater
target detection and forensic science being two obvious examples.
It is also very clear in medical science and in medical training,
where the nature and application of knowledge are undergoing
similar transformations.
Much of the work described in this article reflected the
author’s origins in the cognitive sciences but it also capitalized
on concepts, practices, and assumptions from older disciplines,
involving oceanography and history in particular. Furthermore,
and as argued by Thagard, trading zones are likely to flourish
when they involve “people, places, organizations, ideas, and
methods,” and the arcane world of wreck-hunting provided a
fascinating and challenging “trading zone.”
CONCLUSION
The critical issue discussed in this article concerned the location
of the wreck of the German raider Kormoran off the coast
of Western Australia. An accurate solution required cognitive
analysis of a chaotic database comprising more than 70 reports,
a decision preceded by decisions to set aside oceanographic,
navigation, map dowsing, historical and oral history arguments.
The procedure reflected exceptional collaboration involving three
or possibly more “trading zones,” a critical step for innovation in
science.
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